Background

To understand the data, one must first understand the chronology of the policy decisions that generated it. Our timeline analysis reveals that while the United States and China entered the pandemic almost simultaneously, their paths diverged radically within the first three months. As illustrated in our project timeline, the narrative begins in unison: the first confirmed case in the U.S. occurred on January 21, 2020, followed merely two days later by China’s unprecedented lockdown of Wuhan on January 23 (DH 101 Timeline). At this moment, both nations prioritized immediate containment. However, the timelines fractured in March 2020. China implemented the “Five-One” policy on March 29, severely restricting international flights to one per airline, per country, per week, effectively sealing the nation off from the world. Conversely, while the U.S. issued “Do Not Travel” advisories in March and suspended entry for foreign nationals who had been in China, its approach remained decentralized and porous compared to China’s absolute border closure.

The divergence widened significantly in 2021. The United States pivoted toward a strategy of mitigation through vaccination, marked by the FDA’s emergency authorization of the Pfizer vaccine in late 2020 and the subsequent lifting of travel bans for vaccinated visitors on November 8, 2021. This pivotal moment effectively signaled to the world that America was “open for business,” prioritizing economic mobility over total viral suppression. In stark contrast, China doubled down on containment throughout 2021 and 2022, maintaining strict quarantine protocols and the Zero-COVID policy even as other nations liberalized borders. It was not until January 8, 2023, nearly three years after the initial outbreak, that China finally abolished inbound quarantine measures and reopened its borders. This three-year gap between the U.S. reopening (2021) and the Chinese reopening (2023) provides the temporal framework for our data analysis, creating a clear “treatment” period where policy stringency was the primary variable influencing tourism outputs.

To quantify the impact of these timeline events, our research methodology required bridging the gap between epidemiological policy and economic output. We constructed our primary dataset by synthesizing four distinct sources: the UNWTO Tourism Statistics Database, the U.S. Travel & Tourism Satellite Account (TTSA), the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT), and the Google Health COVID-19 Open Data Repository (Technical Description).

The processing phase involved significant data cleaning using Python’s Pandas library within a Google Colab environment. For the UNWTO data, we extracted specific country-level indicators for “Inbound Arrivals” and “Inbound Expenditure” for China and the U.S. from 2018 to 2023. This allowed us to establish a pre-pandemic baseline (2018–2019) to accurately measure the depth of the 2020 collapse and the rate of subsequent recovery. We then merged this financial data with the OxCGRT’s “Stringency Index,” a composite score ranging from 0 to 100 that tracks metrics such as school closures, travel bans, and stay-at-home orders. By aligning these daily stringency scores with annual tourism revenue data, we were able to visualize the inverse relationship between government control and economic vitality.

Furthermore, we incorporated the TTSA data to provide a granular view of the U.S. domestic economy. Because international travel effectively ceased in 2020, relying solely on international arrival data would obscure the internal recovery of large domestic markets. The TTSA allowed us to break down “real tourism output” into specific sectors like accommodation and air transportation, revealing internal resilience that international statistics missed.

While these datasets allow for robust quantitative analysis, it is vital to acknowledge the ideological framing, or ontology, inherent in their structure. As noted in our data critique, the UNWTO and TTSA datasets categorize tourism purely as an economic activity, measured in “arrivals,” “expenditure,” and “value added.” This framework treats the tourist not as a human subject seeking cultural exchange, but as a unit of economic production, a consumer whose primary function is to transfer capital across borders (Data Critique).

Consequently, our dataset illuminates the financial magnitude of the pandemic but obscures the human and social dimensions. For example, the TTSA data can show us that “Food and Beverage” revenue dropped by 40% in 2020, but it cannot capture the closure of family-owned restaurants or the loss of culinary heritage. Similarly, the OxCGRT tracks the existence of a policy (e.g., “international travel controls”) but not the public sentiment or compliance regarding that policy. We do not know from this data alone whether citizens felt safer or more isolated; we only know that their movement was legally restricted. Therefore, our findings should be interpreted as a macroeconomic assessment of policy impacts rather than a sociological study of the traveler experience. This quantitative lens privileges state-level efficiency and fiscal resilience, framing the pandemic primarily as a problem of lost revenue rather than lost connection.